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Abstract  -  It is argued that the trade-off interaction between agglomeration 
economies and transportation costs cannot be excluded from the analysis of the 
central-place system. First, an overlapping-area model between two 
competitors of market areas is examined both cases in homogeneous and 
differentiated products together with the relevant formation of supply areas.  
The analysis then further explores an exclusive-area model in the duopoly and 
oligopoly conditions of market areas and the formation process of supply areas.  
Finally, consideration is given to the methodological connectivity between 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concern of the paper is to clarify the structural relevance between 
market areas and supply areas through the investigation of firm location under 
the given conditions of market demand, deposit of inputs, technologies for 
production and spatial competition in both types of area.  This can be referred to 
the input-output framework and there is certain established framework in 
location analysis.  Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) initially combined supply 
nodes with demand nodes by means of linear programming model between two 
distant locations and solve the problem of profit maximization condition of a 
producer by minimizing costs of transportation.  However, this approach 
insufficiently includes the notion of spatially constrained economic factors.  
These economic factors have been well considered on the field of new 
economic geography.  The interaction between vertical specialization and trade 
is examined by Hummels et al., (1995), applying input-output tables to 
sequential linkages of intermediate goods together with empirical studies.  
 
In terms of agglomeration economies and trade, Parr et al., (2002) 
investigate the regional economies in the U.S. Midwest with the notion of 
hollowing out, and the structural change in firms and establishments caused 
from the reduction of transportation and transaction costs.  For the recent spatial 
linear-programming approach, Jones and Kierzkowski (2005) explore the 
methodological connectivity between input and output, including the notions of 
vertical integration, increase in scale and fragmentation of production.  
Moreover, Silva and Hewings (2007) examine the multi-located firms and 
separation of location by the inclusion of communication cost and firm 
contracts in the principal-agent theory.   
 
These studies can be further detailed in spatial framework by the 
application of central-place system.  However, established central-place theory 
has been independently investigated the framework of input and output as 
supply-area and market-area systems, which has little attention to the integrated 
input-output framework.  While the integrated framework of both types of area 
would be treated as an extended version of the duality theory, this input-output 
framework would not be complete unless the analysis took additional spatial 
factors into consideration.  These factors are suggested to be parts of spatially 
unconstrained and constrained internal and external economies.  The spatially 
constrained types of economies are called agglomeration economies and these, 
together with spatially unconstrained types of economies, constitute the 
neglected factors in existing central-place theory.  As agglomeration economies 
have a trade-off interaction with transportation costs, an analysis of 
transportation system and network is also required to include in the model.  The 
relationship between transportation networks and market-area boundaries 
should be referred to Beckmann (1968 : 83-85) and this can also be applied to   Région et Développement  195 
the framework of supply-area transportation network.  This paper will clarify 
the importance of these neglected factors to be included in the integrated 
framework of market-area and supply-area systems.  This alternative approach 
not only demonstrates the effects of market area change on the spatial structure 
of supply area but also investigates the incentives governing the determination 
of the firm location.   
 
The analysis of market areas were systematically examined by Lösch 
(1954) in terms of spatial competition, with demand conditions, technology and 
factor prices given.  By contrast, supply areas were initially explored by Lösch 
(1938) with respect to spatial competition of inputs with the given structures of 
assembly cost, technology and the demand conditions of output.  However, 
there exists a problem that neither market-area analysis nor supply-area analysis 
has dealt with the location of production.  From the standpoint of a producer, 
every plant has supply areas to obtain inputs from suppliers, and market areas to 
distribute output.  This implies that both types of area should be investigated 
within a single framework.  Treatment of an integrated methodology will be 
prefaced by a consideration of the input-output framework which is referred to 
conventional economic analysis as duality theory.  According to Shepard 
(1953), this theory states that the unknown cost function is derived from the 
given production function and structure of factor cost, and that the unknown 
production function is derived from the given cost function and structure of 
factor cost.  From these relations, the duality theory can also be stated in terms 
of an input-output framework:  The unknown cost function is derived from the 
given structure of factor cost and production function.  By contrast, the 
unknown structure of factor cost is derived from the given cost and production 
functions.  Applying this notion, the market-area system and supply-area system 
are connected by means of spatial production function.  In this paper, the 
integrated central-place approach will be applied to four hypotheses of spatial 
competition and will be observed by the effects of various economic forces on 
the  decision-making of the firm location.  In addition, it is clarified that 
agglomeration economies have a crucial role in the existing framework of 
market-area and supply-area systems through the analysis of cooperative and 
competing relationships between producers in an economic plain. 
   
2. AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES AND FIRM LOCATION 
 
As introduced in the previous section, the notions of agglomeration 
economies are essential factors for the analysis of firm location and spatial 
organization.  These economies have criteria of scale, scope and complexity 
dimensions, together with two dimensions that are internal and external to the 
firm.  In terms of internal aspect to the firm, first, economies of scale 
(horizontal integration) indicate that there is an availability of cost saving as the 
production scale increases, where average production cost forms a shape of 196       Daisuke Nakamura 
decreasing returns to scale.  Second, economies of scope (lateral integration) are 
observed when varieties of production achieve more efficient and less  cost 
operation than with the single processing of products.  This can be interpreted as 
an utilization of fixed-cost element by means of maximizing usage of residual 
production facilities.  Finally, economies of complexity (vertical integration) 
represent  the opportunity of cost saving by integrating multiple processing 
stages on the upstream and downstream linkages of a firm.  If these three types 
of economies require spatial proximity, these are referred to spatially 
constrained internal economies.   
 
With respect to external economies, the criterion of scale is referred to as 
localization economies.  These economies are observed when there are 
possibilities for firms to obtain labor cost savings, joint action for input 
extraction and specialized services.  The criterion of scope is relevant with 
urbanization economies, which are generally located in metropolitan areas as a 
result of the various cost saving benefits to be had in such areas.  As 
advantageous factors, administrative accessibility, well-organized infrastructure, 
variety of labor supply, a highly advanced system of transportation and 
communication can be considered.  These involve different and unrelated 
industries in a large urban area.  However, disadvantageous factors such as the 
higher price of land, congestion and pollution also exist as urbanization 
diseconomies.  The criterion of complexity is referred to activity-complex type 
of agglomeration economies, which relies on trade between different firms in a 
product chain.  These economies can be seen at Silicon Valley in California and 
aero-space production complex in Los Angeles and Seattle.  If these three 
criteria of economies do not require spatial proximity, these are referred to 
spatially unconstrained external economies in terms of scale, scope and 
complexity.  As agglomeration economies exist under the certain condition of 
spatial proximity, these are generally involved in extra burden of transportation 
costs in terms of assembly and/or distribution shipping costs.  As a result, 
producers are needed to consider the optimal firm location with the trade-off 
interaction between agglomeration economies and transportation costs.   
 
In order to reveal the importance of agglomeration economies to be 
included in the analysis of firm location, the following four hypothetical 
scenarios will be introduced.  First, in Case A, a perfectly overlapping market-
area structure will be examined.  It assumes two independent brands and that 
their market areas overlap perfectly.  The centers of the market areas and supply 
areas are assumed to be identical, and inputs are shared by both firms.  
Secondly, Case B will explore one of the special cases where two brands share 
the same market area, while owning different centers of distribution.  A notable 
point will be that though they are sharing the same plain, the market areas are 
not identical between the two firms with respect to the cost minimization   Région et Développement  197 
behaviour.  Thirdly, in Case C, a pattern will be shown that each market area is 
exclusively dominated by one brand of product and that both types of area are 
identical.  One possible reason for having these exclusive patterns is that there 
are gaps between available market-area sizes and the limited production scale of 
the firm.  Finally, Case D will deal with oligopoly competition in Case C.  It 
assumes that there are three independent brands and each market area supplies 
products exclusively from one of the three brands.  The relevant supply area 
will be the same structure as its market area.  The former two cases, Cases A 
and B, will be explored as an overlapping-area model and the latter two, Cases 
C and D, will be investigated as an exclusivity-area model.  
  
3. A MULTIPLE-CENTER OVERLAPPING-AREA MODEL 
 
3.1. Perfectly Overlapping Duopoly Market Areas (Case A) 
 
An overlapping spatial pattern of market areas under the condition of 
perfectly-overlapping duopoly market areas and the relevant structure of supply 
areas will be analyzed.  
 
This case shows that there is no exclusivity in the market areas between 
the two product-differentiated brands a and  b  .  As shown in figure 1, they 
share the same market area.  This case will assume that two brands are 
distributed by different companies and that they are competing with another 
brand with respect to output level.  It is also assumed that the two brands are 
similar products and that the two producers have the same technologies and 
other economic conditions.  This spatial pattern shows that two independent 
firms are sharing common market areas. 
   




It seems possible to consider the application of the Hotelling model in 
this analysis.  Hotelling (1929) investigates the determination of price between 
two competing firms who distribute products at different locations from each 
other.  The equilibrium states that each of the two firms will locate as close as 
possible to the other firm.  However, the Hotelling model cannot be applied to 
this analysis for the following two reasons.  One is that the two goods a re 198       Daisuke Nakamura 
assumed to be homogeneous products and therefore not product differentiated; 
the other is that there is competition over price but not other location factors.  
As a result, the model of price-level adjustment without product differentiation 
cannot be compatible with location analysis, as the latter assumes that product 
differentiation always exists, unless the market price is at a sufficiently high 
level.   
 
Instead of these approaches, this analysis can be examined in terms of 
rivalry and cooperative choices for supply areas between two firms.  In this 
analysis, there will be severe competition between the supply areas of two firms 
as their economic space is very limited and close to each other.  These firms 
choose either rivalry or cooperation.  In this case, cooperative behaviour is 
preferred when their transportation rates are at a sufficiently high level.  As 
examined in Beckmann (1968), two firms can share transportation methods.  
This enables both firms to achieve certain cost savings, by applying economies 
of scale and sharing fixed costs, particularly in the case where specialized 
shipping is required for both brands of product.  In addition, under the 
assumption of product differentiation, the two firms may have joint production 
in the upstream production stages as each firm produces similar goods.  
However, cooperative behaviour may not be observed if there is a severe spatial 
competition over occupying consumer demand in market areas.  As a result, the 
duopoly model of this spatial pattern also relies on the condition of demand for 
both brands.  This is more plausible in this spatial pattern, as the two brands 
share the same market areas implying that there is high demand for these 
brands.  In this way, the condition of supply areas depends not only on the 
transportation network system but also on the structure of market areas.   
 




There is one more thing which should be examined in this spatial pattern 
with respect to high transportation cost for output.  Under the condition of the   Région et Développement  199 
ƒ.o.b. pricing system, certain levels of increase in transportation rate, reduce the 
volume of demand cone, as examined in Lösch (1954).  In figure 2, the original 
demand cone for the market area is illustrated as DC1.  In the figure, a highly 
increased distribution rate of transportation t shifts the demand cone to  DC2.  
For reasons of simplicity, let us assume that the end of the market-area radius 
for DC2 is UC which equals the half distance between the center of the two 
brands and the end of the market area.  Similarly, the end of the market-area 
radius for DC1 is US which equals half the diagonal distance of the market area 
of the two brands. 
 
As illustrated in figure 3, the original demand cone DC1 forms square 
market areas as previously defined in figure 2.  The alternative demand cone 
DC2  forms circular market areas with radius  UC .  Due to the increase in 
transportation rate t, consumers located in the outer circle will be excluded from 
the market of these products  a and  b .  In order to avoid the consumer 
exclusion, the local authority pays subsidies to fill the space, or another brand 
g  will enter to the market.  If brand  g  appears in the market, the s patial 
structure becomes an overlapping oligopoly situation.  Although the space is 
completely filled by the three firms in this circumstance, there are still 
consumer exclusions.  Some residents have choices of all brands but others have 
limited choices of either brands a and  b ,  b and  g , or  a and  g .  This type of 
consumer exclusion of oligopoly case will be further explored in later Case D. 
 




3.2. Overlapping Duopoly Market Areas and Product Differentiation (Case 
B) 
 
A partly overlapping duopoly market area and the relevant supply areas 
will be demonstrated under the condition of product differentiation.  This case 
shows that there are two brands a andb  in the market and that their market 
areas overlap but do not share the center of these areas.  In this case, consumers 200       Daisuke Nakamura 
( ) ( )( ) b b a a q p P q p P M ￿ - + ￿ = 1
choose either brand according to consumer preference between the two brands.  
As a result, this analysis requires to draw on consumer theory.  The examination 
procedure will be as follows.  If a consumer prefers brand  b  to a, his utility 
maximization behaviour can be stated with the expression  b a p .  Using this 
term, a representative consumer’s utility maximization problem can generally 
be denoted as the following statement.  
  
maximize    ) , ( b a U U =   
such that  
where                
      
 
where  = U consumer’s utility function,  = M consumer’s budget constraint and 
= P parameter.  As denoted in the above statement, this consumer cannot 
maximize his utility by the combination of two brands:  he can do so only by 
choosing either brand a or b  if the product is too expensive to purchase two 
brands, i.e., in the case of a car or a fridge.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates Case B where brand a and brand b  have different 
centers but share the same market areas.  In this figure, either brand a or b is 
chosen by consumers according to the balance between consumer preference 
and transportation costs to the distribution point. This is a trade-off interaction 
between preferences of goods and the additional transportation cost burden. 
 




Figure 5 illustrates the ƒ.o.b price and consumer budget constraint M.  In 
this case, a consumer A located at a  will choose brand  b  over the nearer brand 
0 = P b a p if 
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a if he prefers brand  b  and his payoff p  for  b  as  b p  satisfies the condition 
p M - > b p   . 
 




The above case shows that he is located at the distribution of brand a.  
This is an extreme case and consumers may be located at any points between 
the distributions of the two brands.  In order to consider a more general 
condition, let us assume that there is a consumer who prefers brand  b  to a but 
is located closer to the seller of brand a.  In this case, if his preference for brand 
b  is weaker than the additional transportation cost burden, he will give up 
obtaining brand  b  and compromise to purchase brand a  from the nearer seller.  
However, if his preference for brand  b  is stronger than the additional 
transportation burden, he will put up with travelling a long distance and paying 
a higher price to purchase brand  b  from a distant seller.  From the time-leisure 
standpoint of view, it can be stated that the temperate-humidity index will 
increase as the travel distance increases. 
 
Figure 6. Travel cost and consumer preferences 
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Let us suppose that figure 6 illustrates the physical constant travel cost 
curve and two disutility curves  ( ) a A U -  and   ( ) b A U -  of this consumer A for 
obtaining brands a and  b .   
 
The above figure shows that consumer  A will choose brand  b even 
though the nearer seller is brand a.  At the location of brand a, this consumer 
can purchase brand a.  However, his disutility curve for brand  b  is lower than 
for brand a at this point.  If   ( ) b A U -   exceeds the line of actual travel cost at 
location  b , he will not travel to obtain  b and instead purchase brand a as a 
compromise.  This index of compromise can be measured as  ca  — pa in the 
above figure.  In this case, he will be able to obtain brand  b at the cost of  cb   
without compromising the value of  ca — pa .  This disutility curve can also be 
examined with respect to substitution and income effects of the properties of 
complementary goods. 
   
  The formal representation of this spatial consumer utility-maximization 
problem can be stated with the travel costs ta  and  tb  to the distribution point of 
the brands a and  b :   
 
maximize  ) , ( b a U U =  
such that   ( ) ( ) ( ) b b b a a a q t p P q t p P M ￿ + ￿ - + ￿ + ￿ = 1  
where     
 
   
   
As previously examined, the above case also shows that the consumer 
cannot choose both brands a and  b  but can choose either a or  b .  In addition, 
consumers will access another market area if their preferred brand is not 
available within the market area.  This can be illustrated by the ideal range.  If a 
consumer locates at the center of brand a, he will be able to obtain brand  a  
without any shipping cost.  However, if his preference is denoted as P = 0  in 
the above condition, he will travel to the distribution point of brand  b .  In this 
case, his ideal range can be illustrated as the subscribe circle of the brand a 
market area as shown in figure 7.  The size of the ideal range depends on the 
relative levels of price  pi   and distribution transportation rate ti (i =  a, b ) 
between the two brands.   
 
  Regarding the producers, there are four centers of brand  b  at the 
market-area boundary of brand a.  Similarly, there are four centers of brand a  
0 = P b a p if
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at the boundary of brand  b .  The relevant supply areas can be illustrated in 
figure 8.  In this case, the supply areas will not necessarily be shared between 
two firms if the condition of limited supply does not exist.   
 








4. A MULTIPLE-CENTER EXCLUSIVITY-AREA MODEL 
 
4.1. Duopoly and Exclusivity of Market Areas (Case C) 
 
This spatial pattern shows that there are two types of similar brands a 
and  b  on an economic plain and that each brand is exclusively distributed to 
each market area.  Thus, there is no overlapping area, as illustrated in figure 9. 
 
This particular duopoly model can be observed in the following 
economic circumstances.  As shown in figure 10, there is an extremely high 
level of distribution transportation rate.  In addition, this level is too high to 204       Daisuke Nakamura 
distribute goods over more than half of the market area.  In this case, the two 
brands may have a spatially dispersed and exclusive market area structure.  The 
second case is where there is an extremely high level of assembly transportation 
rate for processing each brand, and the size of each market is small enough to 
avoid spatial confliction.   
 








This approach can also follow the economic law of market areas.  When 
the price levels and transportation rates of both products are equivalent,  pa =  
p b   and  ta  =  t b , the boundaries will be shown as in the above figure.  
Alternatively, it is not necessary to satisfy  pa =  pb  and  ta =  t b  if  pa + ta = pb  
+ t b .  It should be noted that this spatial allocation also corresponds to the 
supply areas if other variables are indifferent to market areas.  
 
However, if  pa ? p b   and  ta  ? t b , the supply-area size can differ from 
the size of market area, even though the above alternative necessary condition 
pa + ta = p b  + t b  is satisfied, since supply-area size relies also on factor price 
and assembly transportation cost.   
 
  This example can also be found in the following three cases.  First, 
when the size of market areas is extremely large, the feasible distance of 
delivery is limited by this size, and the relevant competitors cannot overlap their   Région et Développement  205 
market areas.  Second, when the optimal production scale is very small, 
individual firms cannot satisfy the entire demand of the market areas and their 
feasible size of market area is limited below the overlapping level.  Finally, 
when Cournot’s (1838) duopoly equilibrium is applied, in which unprofitable 
price adjustment is replaced by quantity adjustment, excess demand will appear 
and a single firm cannot occupy the entire market.  In these cases, the economic 
plain can be shared between two firms without overlap.  In this case, consumers 
have to accept an elastic supply curve condition beyond certain levels of market 
price as shown in figure 11.   
 




This Case C can demonstrate a spatial equilibrium under the conditions 
of duopoly and exclusive structure of market areas.  The equilibrium model is 
illustrated in figure 12.  In this figure, Phase (I) shows the spatial equilibrium of 
two market areas, Phase (II) depicts the spatial equilibrium in the market area 
provided exclusively with brand a , Phase (III)  shows spatial equilibrium in a 
market area provided exclusively with brand  b , and Phase (IV) represents the 
22.5° reflection line, which is the half of the  ￿ 45  reflection line, which connects 
Phases (II) and (III) to Phase (I).  If the market areas of the two brands do not 
have a symmetric price condition, this 22.5° reflection line will become more or 
less steep in order to adjust the aggregate level in Phase (I).  Thus, the slope of 
this line represents the price ratio of market areas between the two brands a  and 
b  on the plain.  However, the condition of equal market-area size level ua = 
u b  must be satisfied as shown in the figure.  This situation, where the same 
market-area size level but different output level between two brands, can be 
observed where the transportation rate for either distribution t or assembly t  of 
one brand is higher than the other.  This is one of the ways that the products are 
differentiated with respect to location analysis. 206       Daisuke Nakamura 
 




In this case, consumers located at the site of the higher-price brand face 
consumer exclusion as they cannot choose the less expensive brand due to 
accessibility in terms of budget constraint.  Likewise, consumers located at the 
site of the other brand in the market area also experience consumer exclusion, 
as they cannot choose the higher-price brand even if they are willing to obtain 
this product.   
 
There is one more instance of consumer exclusion in this case of spatial 
pattern.  As shown in figure 13 consumers located at the outer circles of each 
market area cannot obtain any products if the transportation rate and price are at 
a sufficiently high level.   
 
In order to avoid this problem, the local authority may provide subsidies 
and entire areas will have a space-filling economic pattern.  Otherwise, another 
brand  g  may enter the market to fill the entire space and form an oligopoly 
structure.  In this new-entrant case, consumers in each market area of brands a    Région et Développement  207 
and  b   will be reduced certain volume of output.  If these potential losses 
exceed cost minimizing circular strategy, two existing brands a and  b  will 
occupy a square space-filling spatial structure without relying on public 
subsidies.  These losses can be explained by the cost of changing to a smaller 
scale of production facilities and by the decreased amount of revenue from 
reduced sales of outputs.  This is shown in figure 14 by changes in cost and 
revenue curves.  In other words, the optimal output level is reduced from  q1 to 
q2.  In addition, the corresponding cost and price levels  c1 and  p1 are increased 
to c2 and  p2, respectively.   
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4.2. Oligopoly and Exclusivity of Market Areas (Case D) 
 
This case will introduce three completely product differentiated brands, 
a,  b  and  g , distributed by three independent companies.  The previous cases 
examine duopoly models where two different brands a and  b  fill the economic 
space in either an overlapping or exclusive form, and potential new entrants to 
the market can also be observed.  In the cases that follow, the market areas will 
be of a regular hexagonal oligopoly form once a new entrant joins the market 
and all firms achieve space-filling equilibria.  The situation is either mutually 
exclusive market areas or perfectly overlapping.  The former pattern is shown in 
figure 15.  These types of spatial pattern are examined as the n- competitor case 
of the duopoly model.   
 
  There is one more case of a space-filling structure which is an 
intermediate case between the above two types.  This case occurs when the 
following three conditions apply.  First, the entire market area is too large for 
every brand to be sold.  Second, there are insufficient numbers of consumers in 
each market area for every brand.  Finally, the assembly plant of each brand 
must be dispersed across the economic plain.  This final condition is due to the 
fact that the relevant volume of deposits of inputs is limited per square-
kilometer and the assembly transportation rate is at a high level.  This figure 
forms a symmetric hexagonal market-area and supply-area structure.  However, 
they are completely different from the other existing hexagonal spatial analysis. 
 
Figure 15. Market-area and supply-area territories between  




This particular case in the diagram is observed only if a further three 
conditions are assumed.  First, there are three independent companies and each   Région et Développement  209 
company has the same conditions for operating their economic activity.  
Second, no market areas overlap in order for the exclusivity condition to be 
strictly kept in the assumption.  Finally, the three different products are 
complementary in order for there to be no incentive for displaying preference 
for one of the brands.   
 
There can be consumer exclusion in some areas, for example outside the 
circles shown in figure 16.  In this oligopoly case, these areas are smaller than 
those of the duopoly case since the oligopoly case forms regular hexagons while 
the duopoly forms squares.  It can be interpreted from this case that if the local 
authority considers subsidizing the industry to support consumer demand, the 
oligopoly case will have a lower cost structure than that of the duopoly square 
case.   
 




The formation of duopoly or oligopoly spatial structures with respect to 
consumer exclusions and price adjustment can be summarized by the following 
four types of attributes.  The duopoly situation is maintained when the existing 
two firms reduce their price levels down to consumer’s maximum reservation 
price level in order to avoid a new entrant to the market.  Another case is when 
these existing firms receive subsidies from local authorities for the equivalent 
amount of price reductions.  These effects are shown as the changes to the 
dashed price line in figure 17. 
   
By contrast, the duopoly situation is not maintained and the market 
becomes an oligopoly when a new entrant g  locates between the two brands a  
and  b , or a new entrant g  sets a  c.i.ƒ. price setting which is equivalent to the 
level of the maximum consumer reservation price. The former case is illustrated 
in the above figure as g  between two existing brands a  and  b .  The latter case 210       Daisuke Nakamura 
p 
g 
is achieved if the saving cost for the establishment of a new distribution point 
between two brands a  and  b  exceeds this c.i.ƒ. pricing level for brand  g .  
This price level is illustrated in figure 18.   
 








The last case enables all consumers to have two choices from two brands 
and contribute to prevent consumers from consumer exclusions.  In terms of 
consumer exclusions, the overlapping market-area pattern between three brands 
is preferred to the exclusive market-area circumstance.  However, in the case of 
partly overlapping market areas with three brands, there may still be consumer 
exclusion of one or two brands.  As shown in figure 19, in part of market area a, 
all three brands are available to some consumers.  However, either  b  or g  are 
not available to other consumers.  In addition, neither brand  b  nor  g  is 
available in some areas.  These exclusions are caused by the combination of the 
partly overlapped spatial structure of the market areas and the high rate of the 
ƒ.o.b. transportation rate of outputs.   
 
Figure 19. Consumer exclusion in overlapping oligopoly case 
 
 
The above argument can be more precisely examined in figure 20.   
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In the above figure, the line  M represents the budget constraint of a 
representative consumer.  For instance, a consumer A  who locates between the 
distribution points of brands  a  and  b  is able to choose from these two brands.   
However, he cannot purchase brand  g  at this location as the ƒ.o.b. price of 
brand  g  at location A  exceeds his budget constraint level M.  As previously 
examined, this problem may be solved by a subsidiary payment from the local 
authority should they wish to guarantee its availability.   
 




  As shown in earlier, figure 15 illustrates a spatial pattern where three 
brands a ,  b  and  g  exclusively occupy every market area.  In this case, all 
processing may be engaged independently.  If the center of each market area is a 
metropolitan area, the situation could be changed as examined in the notion of 
urbanization diseconomies.  If the product does not require to have location 
proximity to the metropolitan area, firms tend to avoid locating at the center due 
to the presence of urbanization diseconomies.  In this case, firms will locate 
closer to the spatial boundary and other producers.  If all three producers come 
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metropolitan area, and they are producing product-differentiated but similar 
types of goods, the three  firms can situate at a common location and have 
certain types of agglomeration economies.  Under the condition of a uniform 
spatial pattern, the optimal firm location can be illustrated in figure 21.   
 
The relevant supply-area configuration can be shown as figure 22, if other 
conditions are kept constant.  The alternative market-area configuration also 
becomes the same shape.  In this way, including the concept of agglomeration 
economies may change the structure of market-area and supply-area 
configuration.  Not only does this bring cost savings for producers; it also 
solves the problem of consumer exclusion for particular products.   
 




Thus, this is one of the Pareto improvement solutions which are brought 
about by the consideration of agglomeration economies.  However, it should be 
noted that there may still be possibilities to have consumer exclusions when the 
distribution transportation rate increases and market areas become circular 
configurations.  In addition, if the transportation network has an important role 
for this activity, the production should be operated on the triangular 
transportation network as demonstrated in Beckmann (1968).  In this way, 
agglomeration economies and transportation costs cannot be excluded from the 
analysis of firm location with respect to the integrated framework of market-
area analysis and supply-area analysis.   
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5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This paper initially outlines a theoretical framework involving 
hypothetical examples, and then introduces a typology of four cases of spatial 
structure to reveal the mechanism of the several irregular spatial formations of 
market areas and the corresponding structures of supply areas.  From these 
attempts, it is revealed that plant location is not required to be investigated, as 
the individual firm is considered to be operating under  optimal-production 
conditions. 
 
However, if a specific exceptional spatial structure is observed, particular 
locational patterns and production conditions will require to be investigated, 
taking into account the spatially unconstrained and constrained internal and 
external economic factors.  In addition, it can be stated that economic policies 
for solving the spatial consumer exclusion problem can be formed by giving full 
consideration to the effect of market-area and supply-area configurations on 
spatially unconstrained and constrained economic factors concerning the 
location of production firms.   
 
  This analysis also provides evidence showing the extent of the 
importance of the additional locational factors, with respect to the spatial 
constraints and spatial enhancement forces of economies.  However, it should 
be noted that these hypothetical scenarios require dynamic analysis between 
upstream and downstream linkages or between earlier and later stages of 
processing.  In addition, certain competition models of entries and exits of firms 
also need dynamic investigation by the framework of game theory.  Related to 
the game approach, the decision-making between upstream and downstream 
linkages can be analyzed by observing negotiation process and dominant 
strategies.  Spatial industrial integration and dispersion, or operational 
integration and disintegration can also be examined on the framework of the 
transactions and contracts of firms. 
 
In order to observe the motion of individuals, firms, and local authorities 
in spatial context, these notions of the equilibrium concept should be applied to 
the analysis of this integrated framework approach.  Finally, as demonstrated in 
the final part of this analysis, economies of scale and entry barriers of fixed 
costs can be further expanded with respect to the address model, which is the 
primitive spatial framework in conventional economic theory.  Such extensions 
are beyond the scope of this analysis, however, they can provide a basis for 
further in-depth investigation into location theory.   
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CONCURRENCE SPATIALE,  SYSTÈME DE PLACES CENTRALES 
ET ÉCONOMIES D’AGGLOMÉRATION 
 
Résumé - Cet article montre que l’arbitrage  entre économies d’agglomération 
et coûts de transport est un élément essentiel dans la formation des places 
centrales. Dans un premier temps, nous examinons les effets de concurrence 
spatiale entre deux producteurs, selon qu’ils offrent des produits homogènes ou 
différenciés. Par la suite, nous élargissons l’analyse au cas de l’oligopole. 
Enfin, un ensemble de problèmes méthodologiques est considéré concernant la 
relation entre économies d’agglomération et formation des places centrales. 
 